This paper documents and analyzes the immediate economic impact of the Indian Ocean tsunami generated by the SumatraAndaman earthquake of 26 December 2004, with a focus on Indonesia (Aceh province) and Sri Lanka, and assesses the disaster management process. The preliminary findings point to the importance of educating the public about simple precautions in the event of a disaster and enforcing coastal environmental regulations. The findings also argue for designing policies and programs, as an integral part of national development strategies, for mitigating the impact of natural disasters on the poor and highlight the need for combining international aid commitments with solutions to the limited aid-absorptive capacity in disaster-affected countries.
Introduction
With a death toll of about 350,000, the Indian Ocean tsunami caused by the deep-sea earthquake near northern Sumatra on 26 December 2004 was the worst natural disaster of that kind in recorded human history.
1 Apart from the sheer number of deaths, two unique features of this tsunami make it a valuable laboratory for the study of disaster management issues in the new millennium. First, it was the world's ªrst truly global disaster, with lives shattered in a dozen countries and on two different continents. Second, the response to the disaster was global in a way rarely seen before: in addition to the aid given by donor governments and agencies, tens of millions of ordinary citizens reached into their pockets to help. In some donor nations, such as the United Kingdom, United States, Italy, and Germany, the private donations surpassed the sizable government aid commitments, and for the ªrst time corporate donors ªgured prominently among private donors.
The vast geographic spread of the disaster produced a huge logistic challenge for international organizations and aid agencies. It also rekindled international interest in setting up a global disaster monitoring system and initiating other cooperative actions to increase public awareness of calamities of this nature at the global and regional level. The massive aid ºows have drawn attention to several new issues for international aid operations, such as avoiding the duplication of tasks, setting up procedures for translating aid pledges into actual aid ºows, and ªnding ways of avoiding the untoward effects of massive inºows of aid entering the affected countries in an unplanned fashion. The unprecedented preference shown by individual donors to informal private channels has thrown into sharper relief the waning public conªdence in aid organizations and in the governments of some of the countries receiving aid.
The devastation caused by the tsunami has revealed a close connection between the magnitude of the damage caused by the killer waves and the extent that environmental regulations were violated in the affected countries. Although the height of the waves and their global spread were purely the work of nature, there is clear evidence that the enormous loss of human life was partly a result of modern progress, the ruthless destruction of natural defenses such as coral reefs and coastal mangrove forests, and the construction of oceanfront hotels and villas in violation of coastal conservation legislation.
The purpose of this paper is to document the nature and extent of the disaster and to undertake a preliminary analysis of the economic impact and disaster management process in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, in order to set the stage for a deeper analysis of these and related issues and identify policy lessons. We present case studies of the two worst-affected countries, Indonesia (Aceh province) and Sri Lanka, focusing on the history of natural disasters in these countries and the preparedness (or lack of it) for facing them, the economic impacts of the tsunami, and the crisis management experience in these countries to date.
The Indian Ocean tsunami: An overview
On 26 December 2004 at 0059 GMT (just before 8 A.M. local time), an earthquake measuring 9.0 on the Richter scale occurred about 30 kilometers off the west coast of Sumatra. The epicenter was at the extreme western end of the Ring of Fire, a zone of frequent volcanic eruption partly encircling the Paciªc Basin that accounts for over 80 percent of the world's largest earthquakes. This was the ªfth-largest earthquake for a century and the largest since the one in Prince William Sound in Alaska in 1964, which measured 9.2 on the Richter scale. It ruptured about 1,300 kilometers of the fault boundary between the Indo-Australian Plate and the southeastern Eurasian Plate, slipping the former under the latter and lifting the seabed by as much as by 5 m (16 feet). The initial energy released by the eruption was estimated to be about the same as that of 25 Hiroshima bombs (Lay, Kanamori, and Ammon 2005) .
The tsunami split about 8 minutes after the rupture, sending energy pulses east toward the Sumatran coast and west across the open sea in the Bay of Bengal at speeds up to 800 kilometers an hour (the speed of a modern jet plane at full throttle).
The eastward-moving wave reached land ªrst, pulling water away from the Sumatran shore. The height of the leading wave increased to as much as 24.4 m as it approached the shallow waters of the province of Aceh, Sumatra, 28 minutes after the earthquake (National Geographic 2005) . The westward, long-distance tsunami progressed crest ªrst. Its arc widened as it continued west, eventually hitting the coastal areas of Thailand, Myanmar, India (Tamil Nadu and Andaman and Nicobar Islands), Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania (ªgure 1).
Aceh province, Sumatra, the land mass closest to the epicenter of the earthquake, bore the full brunt of the eastward-moving tsunami. Sri Lanka was the next-worstaffected area because there was no landmass between it and the epicenter to cushion the coastlines in the north, east, and south. The fault line of the earthquake was in a north-south orientation. The great strength of the long-distance tsunami was therefore in an east-west direction. This explains why Bangladesh, which lies on the northern end of the Bay of Bengal, had very few casualties, despite being a lowlying country regularly devastated by cyclones, and why Somalia was hit harder than Bangladesh, despite being farther from the epicenter. The physical oceanography of the Indian Ocean during the month of December also seems to have played a role in determining the path and the severity of the tsunami waves. In December, during the northeast monsoon, the equatorial Indian Ocean jet stream propagates along the equator from Sumatra (near the epicenter of the earthquake) slightly to the south of Sri Lanka and to Somalia. The ampliªcation of the tsunami by these strong winds was perhaps an additional reason why the impact of the waves was so severe in Sri Lanka, why the Indian state of Kerala was badly hit despite the cover provided by the landmass of Sri Lanka, and why the impact on Somalia (and also Kenya and Tanzania) was disproportionate to their long distances from the epicenter of the earthquake.
The Paciªc Tsunami Monitoring Center (PTMC) in Honolulu, Hawaii, 2 detected the earthquake 18 minutes after its occurence and issued an e-mail communiqué to the Paciªc-nation member countries saying that there was no threat to them. A second communiqué 65 minutes after the earthquake indicated the possibility of a tsunami affecting countries in the Indian Ocean. This information was not communicated to the countries in the Indian Ocean region, however, because the PTMC ofªcials did not have the required contacts. There was no warning system in place in the Indian Ocean. Even if the information were made available, it would not have made a big difference because these countries had no effective civil defense mechanism for getting the information to the people. Moreover, unlike in the Paciªc Ocean, tsunamis have occurred only very rarely in the Indian Ocean, and historically tsunami-related calamities have been of minor importance compared with other natural disasters (Abbott 2004, chap. 3; Albala-Bertrand 1993, chap. 2).
The 26 December tsunami was ªrst and foremost a human tragedy. The ofªcial total death toll had passed 220,000 by mid- , with over 140,000 people still missing and presumably dead (table 1) . According to a UN press release of 1 June 2005, 3 Secretary General of the United Nations Koª Annan described the catastrophe as "the largest natural disaster the organization has had to respond to on behalf of the world community, in the 60 years of our existence." The macroeconomic impacts on Indonesia, India, and Thailand are unlikely to be severe compared with the shocking human toll. Despite the misery, the impact on the regional GDP growth rate in 2005 is likely to be modest. However, by virtue of their economic size, Sri Lanka and Maldives will probably experience proportionately much greater immediate and medium-term impacts on economic growth than those experienced by Indonesia, India, and Thailand. The region's ªnancial markets have remained "strangely serene" (Economist Intelligence Unit 2005, 1 limited economic impact is that the tsunami missed the industrial and commercial centers of all the affected countries other than Maldives. The impact on the global ªnancial market was rather muted because many of the damaged facilities were uninsured, thereby minimizing the exposure of Western and Asian ªnancial services companies to the destruction caused by the tsunami. 4 The massive aid pledges played a crucial cushioning role in maintaining business conªdence in the affected countries.
The donor response to the tsunami crisis has been unprecedented. According to records maintained by the Ofªce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid of the United Nations, 78 countries, 30 organizations, and many individual donors had pledged US$6.3 billion by 21 (table 2) . In addition, the total amount given through direct private contributions was unprecedented; according to some estimates, it amounted to more than US$1.6 billion. In addition to the direct aid pledges, at its meeting in Paris on 12 January 2005, the Paris Club of creditor nations declared a moratorium on the foreign debt of the tsunami-hit countries. 6 Some key players in the international aid community, including
World Bank President James Wolfensohn, suggested that debt write-offs would be preferable to debt deferral. However, this proposal was not accepted because it raised the question of moral hazard; that is, countries absolved of debt might borrow excessively or recklessly in the future in the expectation that they would even-tually be bailed out. The IMF and World Bank ofªcially endorsed the moratorium, and the major international credit-rating agencies declared that they would not regard deferral of debt service payments as a negative factor in their future risk assessments and credit ratings. Subsequently, the IMF and the World Bank also announced considerable debt relief for the affected countries, in particular Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia. In , the Asian Development Bank set up a US$600 million Asian Tsunami Fund to provide grants for emergency technical assistance and reconstruction projects.
Indonesia

Historical perspective of natural disasters
Located in the Ring of Fire, Indonesia has the largest number of active volcanoes in the world. Approximately 10 percent of the world's recorded seismic activity has occurred in the Indonesian archipelago (Tomascik et al. 1997) . 7 The country has hundreds of volcanoes, of which approximately 76 percent have been active historically. The majority of these volcanoes are located in the arc of Sumatra, Java, and the Lesser Sunda Islands. There have been 1,171 recorded volcanic eruptions in Indonesia, a record that is only slightly lower than that of Japan (1,274). Indonesia and Japan together have accounted for one-third of the known eruptions in the world, but Indonesia has suffered the highest numbers of fatalities, mudºows, tsunamis, domes, and pyroclastic ºows, and the greatest damage to arable land. According to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), four-ªfths of Indonesia's dated volcanic eruptions have occurred in this century (USGS 2003) . Two of these eruptions are among the largest ever recorded. The average (per event) death toll from tsunamis amounted to 960, compared with 140 from earthquakes and 37 from cyclones. Figure 2 depicts the number and magnitude of major earthquakes (i.e., those with magnitudes equal to or greater than 5 on the Richter scale) in Indonesia since 1907. Interestingly, both the frequency and the magnitude of earthquakes have been increasing throughout this period. The most severe natural disasters that have occurred in the country are the following.
• Eruption of the Tambora volcano on Sumbawa Island, West Nusa Tenggara (1815). This was the greatest volcanic eruption in recorded history, with a volcanic explosivity index (VEI) of 7. 8 Tambora's cone, with an estimated volume of 30 km 3 , was blown away, and the total material erupted was 100-300 km 3 . Ash from this eruption was found in the Indian Ocean up to 600 km toward the south but not toward the north. Ash layers 60 cm thick were found at a distance of 70 km from Tabora. This eruption killed approximately 92,000 people. The tremendous amounts of ash thrown into the atmosphere resulted in an abnormally cold summer in the Northern Hemisphere (Tomascik et al. 1997 ).
• Eruption of Krakatoa, a volcanic island located in the Sunda Strait between the islands of Java and Sumatra (1883 atmosphere, coloring sunsets for 2 years. The total death toll was approximately 36,000 (Tomascik et al. 1997; Winchester 2003 ).
• Eruption of Kelut volcano, located on the east side of Java, not far from the relatively populated towns of Kediri and Blitar. This volcano has erupted several times, and two eruptions have caused fatalities. The ªrst eruption (VEI ϭ 5) was in 1586. It produced one of the worst lahars 9 in the historical record of volcanic eruptions and took the lives of about 10,000 people. The second eruption (VEI ϭ 4) was in 1919. In this case, lahars traveled as far as 38 km in less than an hour and devastated more than 15,000 hectares of arable land, destroying 100 villages and killing approximately 5,000 people (van Bergen et al. 2000) .
• Earthquake in Bali on 21 January 1917 (National Geophysical Data Center 2004) .
This earthquake (measured at 6.5 on the Richter scale) and the resultant tsunami together destroyed more than 1,000 houses on the island. Around 15,000 people died during this event. The death toll would have been much higher if the earthquake had not occurred in the morning, when most people were already up and working in the rice ªelds. This was among the 25 deadliest earthquakes in the world.
• Earthquake and tsunami on Flores Island (12 December 1992). This earthquake (measured at 7.5 on the Richter scale) generated tsunami waves as high as 25 m, which penetrated 300 m inland, killing approximately 2,500 people and leaving around 90,000 homeless. Between 50 and 80 percent of the houses and structures on the island were damaged or destroyed. Damage was also reported in surrounding islands, such as Sumba and Alor ( ). An extreme El Niño in the Paciªc caused the drought in 1997. Ocean surface temperatures were much warmer than normal in the east and cooler than usual near Indonesia, shifting rain away from Indonesia (Wheeler 2002) . The drought killed approximately 500 people and starved around 90,000 people, mostly in Papua. The situation worsened when this drought induced forest ªres that destroyed around 9.7 million hectares of forest resources and wildlife habitat across the country, mostly in Kalimantan and Sumatra. The smoke haze affected millions of people in the region, including those in Singapore, Malaysia, and Thai-land. The economic losses in Indonesia were conservatively estimated at over US$4 billion (Applegate et al. 2002; Wheeler 2002; Glover and Jessup 1999) .
In sum, Indonesia has been the victim of some of the worst natural disasters in the world. Moreover, there are clear indications that the frequency of natural disasters in Indonesia has been increasing over time.
The 26 December earthquake and tsunami
The earthquake and tsunami on 26 December 2004 was the worst natural disaster in Indonesian history. Most people in Aceh and North Sumatra, and several regions in Indonesia, could feel the shake caused by the massive eruption that occurred at about 8 A.M. that day. About 15 minutes later, the tsunami hit the northern and western parts of Aceh and North Sumatra, as well as other islands in those regions, such as Nias and Simeulue. Waves as high as 10 m and with speeds of around 800 km/ hour hit the city of Banda Aceh, which is located in the northern part of Aceh. In some places, waves went inland approximately 7.5 km from the coastline. Waves as high as 12 m hit the cities of Meulaboh, Calang, and Lamno, located in the western part of Aceh, and they submerged areas up to about 10 km from the coastline (Soehaimi et al. 2005) .
By mid-March 2005, the ofªcial death toll in Indonesia was close to 167,000, with 128,000 missing (most likely dead) and 811,000 displaced (table 1) . According to ªgures released by the Department of Social Affairs on 17 , 920 people were in hospitals and approximately 477,000 were living in refugee camps (table 5) .
In terms of the number of people killed and missing, the city of Banda Aceh suffered the most, followed by the districts of Aceh Jaya and Aceh Barat. In terms of the percentage of the population affected by the tsunami, Aceh Barat district suffered the most, followed by the city of Banda Aceh, then Aceh Jaya and Aceh Besar districts, in that order. The impact of the earthquake and tsunami was concentrated in these three districts and the city of Banda Aceh.
Based on ªeld visits and interviews immediately and several weeks after the disaster in Aceh, Edward Aspinall reports that children, women, and the elderly accounted for more than two-thirds of the tsunami victims. 10 Thus the demographic structures of many villages and cities heavily hit by the tsunami have dramatically changed. Unlike in Sri Lanka (see section 4), the death toll in Indonesia was much higher than the number of people who were hospitalized or became homeless. It is worth noting the surprisingly low death toll on Simeulue Island, which is situated only about 100 km from the epicenter. Simeulue Island was severely hit by the tsunami: approximately 5,500 houses were destroyed and hundreds of people were injured. However, only seven deaths were recorded (Kompas 2005) . Two reasons likely explain the relatively small number of fatalities. First, the coastal ecosystem, namely the coral reef, sea grass, and mangrove forests in the northern part of the island, softened the force of the giant waves. Second, the local customs and traditions on the island (adat) include an important precautionary procedure for facing a tsunami that is transferred from generation to generation. The procedure is as follows. When someone recognizes the indications of an impending tsunami, he or she runs to the closest hill, shouting "smong . . . smong . . . smong" ("tsunami" in the local language). Others who hear the warning also run to the closest hill while contributing to the "smong . . . smong . . . smong" chorus. This simple procedure proved to be very effective in the recent tsunami (Wetlands International-Indonesia Programme 2005) . In other areas of Aceh and North Sumatra, such simple traditional mitigation procedures imbedded in local culture had never existed or had been forgotten.
Evidence of the importance of the coastal ecosystem in mitigating the impact of a tsunami is seen in the other affected areas of Indonesia as well. For instance, the impact of the tsunami was less severe in areas along the west and east coasts of Aceh where the coastal ecosystem remained in relatively good shape. 
Economic impact
The World Bank, using a standard assessment technique developed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC 2003) , has estimated that the total damage and losses caused by the earthquake and tsunami amounted to approximately US$4.45 billion, or almost 100 percent of Aceh's GDP in 2003 (table 6) . Of this total, 60 percent is from damage and 40 percent is from losses of income ºows to the economy. Around 78 percent of the total damage and losses were borne by the private sector; the rest was borne by the public sector (World Bank 2005) . The Institute for Economics and Social Research (LPEM) at the Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia, estimated the total damage in Aceh at US$4.6 billion (LPEM 2005) . According to LPEM estimates, around one-third of the road networks, schools, and hospitals were destroyed by the tsunami (see table 7 ). According to estimates by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the giant waves ºattened some 115,000 houses and severely damaged another 150,000 (ADB 2005, 11 (2005) has come up with a slightly lower estimate of GDP contraction (22.3 percent). The destruction in the province of North Sumatra was mainly concentrated in Nias, the poorest district in the province and one whose contribution to the overall regional economy is rather small (table 5) .
According to information gathered by the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, by mid-January approximately 55,000 ªshermen and aquaculture workers were conªrmed dead (approximately one-half of the total number of ªshermen in Aceh) and around 14,000 were still missing. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) reported that 40-60 percent of coastal aquaculture ponds along the coast of Aceh and between 36,000 and 48,000 hectares of brackish-water aquaculture ponds (which mainly produced shrimp and milkªsh) were seriously damaged. It is estimated that about 65-70 percent of the small-scale ªshing ºeet and associated gear was destroyed in Aceh, representing approximately 9,500 units, of which 40 percent were canoes, 25 percent were boats with outboard motors, and 35 percent were boats with diesel inboard motors (FAO 2005) .
In Aceh about 30,000 hectares of rice ªelds, amounting to about 10 percent of the total area under rice cultivation in the province, were badly affected. Soil salinity Source: LPEM (2005) .
problems are the main concern. Fortunately, because of the humid conditions in the region, salt-polluted arable land has been cleaned by rainfall and irrigation. A recent survey carried out by FAO shows that salt deposited in more than two-thirds of the affected agricultural land has been leached out already, allowing planting to resume in April and May 2005. Only approximately 9,000 hectares can no longer be used for farming (China View 2005) .
According to data for 2000, approximately 8 percent of Aceh's output was exported to other regions in Indonesia, 26 percent was exported abroad, and 66 percent was consumed within the province. Imports from other regions in Indonesia and imports from abroad accounted for only 6 percent and 4 percent, respectively, of the total material inputs needed for Aceh's production sectors. Therefore, the impact of the decline in Aceh's GDP on Indonesia's overall economic performance is expected to be small. The World Bank estimated that Indonesia's GDP growth in 2005 will be between 0.1 and 0.4 percent lower than the pre-tsunami growth forecast (World Bank 2005) . The LPEM estimate of growth contraction is slightly higher (0.56 percent) (LPEM 2005) .
Before the tsunami, the Ministry for the Development of Least Developed Regions had classiªed 11 districts in Aceh (around 50 percent of the province) as least developed districts. During the 5 years prior to the disaster, Aceh had been experiencing sociopolitical instability and economic disruption because of the escalation of the 29-year-old secessionist rebellion of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). About 900 schools had been destroyed or damaged, and school attendance had dramatically declined. Meanwhile, health care had become less accessible because people were afraid to visit medical facilities for security reasons (Soesastro and Ace 2005; World Bank 2005) . An increase in poverty is probably the most serious economic problem caused by the earthquake and tsunami. In 2002, the Indonesian Central Agency of Statistics calculated that around 30 percent of the people in Aceh were living below the poverty line. LPEM predicted that this ªgure could grow to around 50 percent as a result of the earthquake and tsunami (LPEM 2005) .
The average rate of inºation in Banda Aceh in January 2005 was 7.02 percent, whereas for the whole country it was only 1.43 percent. The highest rates of inºation were for processed food and food products: 19.26 percent and 11.24 percent, respectively (compared with national ªgures of 0.80 percent and 3.11 percent, respectively). Inºation in North Sumatra was around 2.82 percent in January 2005, and the largest contributing factor was the 5.84 percent increase in food prices (CEIC Asia Database, 2005) . House rents are also increasing rapidly. There are reports that the large presence of donors and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) is the main reason for this rent increase.
Disaster management
Government response to a large natural disaster essentially involves three phases:
(1) emergency and rescue operations, (2) rehabilitation of basic socioeconomic infrastructure and restoration of law and order, and (3) actions to revive the economy and governmental system. Because of the difªcult economic and political conditions of Aceh and the sheer magnitude of the devastation and destruction of its infrastructure, the ªrst phase of crisis management has taken a much longer time in Indonesia than it has in Sri Lanka (see section 4.4). Before the tsunami, the conºict between the Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian government had adversely affected economic development of the province and severely constrained the dissemination of information about conditions in Aceh, not only to the rest of the world, but also to other parts of Indonesia. Thus most of Indonesia and the rest of the world knew how badly the tsunami had hit Aceh only by 28 December 2004, whereas news about the impact of the tsunami in Sri Lanka and Thailand was available immediately after the devastation. Poor road networks and telecommunications also made it difªcult to reach many villages along the coast of Aceh to provide emergency rescue services.
In April 2005 the government embarked on the second phase, which is expected to take around 2 years to complete. The third phase will require about 5 more years. The Indonesian National Planning and Development Agency (Bappenas) is developing blueprints for the second and third phases. According to estimates prepared by the Asian Development Bank, reconstruction will require US$1.5 billion in 2005 and up to US$5 billion over the following 5 years. The cost of housing rehabilitation and reconstruction alone is estimated at US$573 million. Funding is expected to come largely from international sources.
The response of international donors has been remarkably quick and overwhelming. By mid-February, 34 countries and various organizations had made pledges and commitments to support emergency relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction in Aceh and North Sumatra. As of , the total pledges and commitments speciªcally targeted to Indonesia have totaled around US$800 million (table 2) . It is important to note that this ªgure does not include various soft loans for the reconstruction of Aceh and North Sumatra. For example, Australia has agreed to provide soft loans amounting to A$500 million throughout [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . Table 2 also does not include the value of the debt moratorium or debt swap offered by several countries (e.g., Germany, France, and Italy). At the meeting of the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) on 19-20 January 2005, CGI members agreed to contribute as much as US$1.7 billion in 2005 for the reconstruction of Aceh. Of this amount, US$1.2 billion will be in the form of grants, and the remaining US$0.5 billion will be project loans on very easy terms (zero or near-zero interest). Of the US$1.2 billion in grants, only US$0.2 billion will be distributed through the Indonesian government. The rest will be distributed through NGOs (Soesastro and Ace 2005) .
The second stage of the crisis management process has proceeded much more slowly than expected, relative to the dates proposed in various government policy declarations. Housing rehabilitation, resettlement of displaced people, and restoration of basic utilities had hardly begun even by mid-May 2005, let alone rehabilitation and reconstruction of roads and bridges (ADB 2005; Economist 2005d) . Over 90 percent of displaced people were still in rehabilitation camps or temporary shelters at this time. Individual agencies were making some progress in resettling affected people and clearing roads along the devastated west coast of Aceh, but the central government had not yet formulated a strategy to coordinate these activities. The role of the local (provincial) government is hampered by the loss of staff and records. In any case, its capabilities are limited, because the army was in de facto control of Aceh for 18 months prior to the disaster as it sought to crush the secessionist rebellion of the Free Aceh Movement.
The delay in reconstruction has more to do with various institutional and procedural bottlenecks than with the availability of funding. The government is faced with two major challenges. 11 The ªrst relates to the ownership of the plan for recovery (or reconstruction). The national government has appointed Bappenas to be the central agency for developing the recovery plan for the tsunami-affected areas in Aceh and North Sumatra. The main challenge for Bappenas is to make all the agencies and organizations that are involved in the reconstruction process feel that they are equal partners or owners of the plan, even though Bappenas will design the plan. So far, the dialogue between Bappenas and local governments has been rather limited. Many local governments feel alienated from the reconstruction process, which is dictated by a central government that did not seek their direct input. Consequently, local governments might want to design their own plans and programs, which could be incompatible with the Bappenas plan, leading to duplication of activities and inefªcient utilization of funds. A related problem is the poor coordina-tion between the NGOs and Bappenas. Many NGOs have resisted following the plans that originated exclusively from Bappenas. Several consortiums of NGOs are currently developing their own reconstruction programs. It is not yet clear how they are going to connect these plans to those of Bappenas or those of the local governments.
The Bappenas recovery plan has already begun to face some problems. Displaced people have reacted negatively to the proposal to resettle them in a new housing complex (the tender for which has allegedly been won by a large national construction company). They prefer to return to their old properties and ªnd local solutions for rebuilding their houses. Although most documents related to property have been lost, people are expecting that there will be a more decentralized mechanism that will enable them to reclaim their properties. Local governments and NGOs seem to support this desire of the local people.
The second challenge relates to setting up an institutional mechanism for implementing the reconstruction plan. The national government wants to establish a new special agency that will coordinate the recovery activities. Local governments and NGOs are not eager to support this idea: they prefer a more decentralized mechanism for reconstructing Aceh and some parts of North Sumatra because they believe this will better accommodate local needs. Clearly, strong coordination among governmental organizations and NGOs is needed so that the implementation of the second and third phase of Aceh and some parts of North Sumatra's reconstruction will be effective and efªcient. Otherwise, these organizations will make their own plans and implement them in an ad hoc manner.
Another important challenge is to ensure that all or most commitments by international donors will materialize in a timely manner. Some commitments may not translate into actual fund ºows for various reasons that are beyond Indonesia's control. However, Indonesia's capacity to absorb domestic aid is also an important factor. It is vital that the Indonesian government and the NGOs join hands to maintain effective communication with donors and engage donors in developing projects and programs, to minimize any mismatches between donors' interests and reconstruction priorities.
Sri Lanka
Historical background
Unlike Indonesia, Sri Lanka is not a disaster-prone country. Floods and droughts are relatively frequent events, but the casualties have never been more than a few hun- (Geiger 1953, 141-48) . According to the Rajavaliya (an account of the kings of Sri Lanka), an area including 100 paunagams (seaport towns) and 970 ªshing villages (in total, representing eleven-twelfths of the kingdom of Kelaniya) was overrun by sea waves (Suraweera 2000) .
Administrative records relating to the Portuguese rule of the coastal provinces of Sri Lanka (1594-1612) mention an earthquake that struck the city of Colombo on 14 April 1615. The earthquake, which occurred at 7 P.M., destroyed a portion of the city wall and 200 houses, killing over 2,000 people (10 percent of the total population of the city). Another earthquake occurred in Batticaloa (on the eastern coast of Sri Lanka) on 14 June 1814, causing only some property damage (Wimalaratne 2005) .
The tsunami triggered by the eruption of the volcanic island of Krakatoa in Indonesia on 27 August 1883 was felt in several places on the eastern and southern coast of Sri Lanka. Around 1.30 P.M. that day, the seas receded, exposing the sea bed for 20 to 70 fathoms from the shore for a few minutes (as happened during the recent tsunami), but fortunately the sea did not return in tidal waves. The waves were only about 4 feet higher than the usual levels. There were only two reported fatalities, and the damage to property was not serious (Daily News 2005; Clarke 1957; Winchester 2003) . Presumably the waves were not as powerful as those of the recent tsunami because of the location of the volcanic eruption and the timing of the event: the Indonesian landmass itself provided a cushion against the waves, and the eruption happened when the seas were calmer (in August rather than December).
Over the past half century only two important natural disasters have occurred in Sri Lanka. In November 1978, a cyclone swept across the northeastern districts of Ampara, Batticaloa, and Polonnariwa. Two thousand people lost their lives and nearly 1 million (7 percent of the total population) became homeless or were otherwise affected by this disaster (Albala-Bertrand 1993, The distance between Sri Lanka and the epicenter of the quake in Sumatra is 1,500 km. At 8:35 A.M. (Sri Lankan time), 2 hours and 17 minutes after the earthquake, the tsunami waves reached Killinochchi (in Ampara district) in the east of Sri Lanka, and over 2,260 km of coastline in the east and north were hit by the waves within the next 15 minutes (see ªgure 3). In many areas, the walls of water were up to 10 m high when they lashed against the shoreline. In some areas the waves did not exactly break, but rather continued inland as a fast stream of high water (like a tidal bloc), swallowing everything in their path. In the Mullativ area in northeast Sri Lanka, the seawater column reportedly traveled inland nearly 5 km from the coast. Given that there was no history of tsunamis in this part of the Indian Ocean and there was no early warning system, the killer waves took the government and people completely by surprise. In several coastal towns and tourist resorts, many people watched the receding of the sea before the tsunami with curiosity and some collected stranded ªsh, and thus easily succumbed to the ferocious waves that came within 10-15 minutes.
In Sri Lanka, as in the other countries affected by the tsunami, there has been harsh criticism of the failure of the government, particularly the Geological Survey and Mine Bureau (GSMB), to give early warning of the impending disaster. According to the director of GSMB, (2005) .
the Richter scale was experienced in some parts of the country. of the coastal belt was the worst affected by the tsunami (see ªgure 3). Based on anecdotal evidence from an LTTE source, Noyalhr (2005) estimates the unrecorded death toll in this area to be between 32,000 and 35,000. Women and children accounted for two-thirds of the fatalities, conªrming patterns observed in various natural disasters in other parts of the world. The number of children who lost both of their parents amounted to 1,060, and 3,414 children lost one parent. Approximately 600 foreign tourists were among the dead.
According to ofªcial estimates, approximately 502,000 people (approximately 3 percent of the total population of Sri Lanka) were displaced and between 1 and 2 mil-25 Asian Economic Papers Indian Ocean Tsunami 16 In the late 1980s, scientists at the GSMB of Sri Lanka became aware of some seismic changes in the Indian Ocean in the neighborhood of Sri Lanka. There was evidence that the IndoAustralian Plate had been splitting over a short geological time, making Sri Lanka vulnerable to seismic activity. GSMB therefore established a seismic monitoring system in Pallekele (near Kandy) in 1999 with ªnancial and technical support from the Scripps Institute of Oceanology of the University of California and the USGS. The center, which became operational in 2001, recorded seismic information and transmitted it to USGS through the head ofªce of GSMB in Colombo (GSMB 1992) . Because the GSMB did not have the capacity to analyze the data, it had to rely on the USGS for the seismic activity reports.
17 The LTTE is a secessionist rebel organization that has been ªghting for an independent homeland (elam) for the ethnic Tamil community in Sri Lanka. For details on the LTTE and the ethnic conºict in Sri Lanka, see various contributions in Rotberg (1999) . lion (10.5 percent) were directly affected by the disaster. The northeast coastal belt of the country was the worst-affected area. Estimates of the percentage of the coastal population affected by the tsunami are 35 percent in Killinochchi, 80 percent in Mulativ, and 78 percent in Ampara coastal divisions. In the southern districts of Galle, Matara, and Hambantota, less than 20 percent of the population was affected, albeit with scattered pockets of severe damage (Asian Development Bank, Japan Bank for International Cooperation, and World Bank 2005) . The tsunami waves largely missed major urban areas and important industrial assets. The port of Colombo and its infrastructure were not affected, apart from minor damage to a few container ships.
One notable surprise that came out of the tsunami disaster was the power of "animal spirit." The Yala National Park, located on the southeastern coast of Sri Lanka, was one of the areas badly hit by the killer waves. Over 200 bodies of tourists and locals were found in the park during rescue operations, but wildlife ofªcials were unable to ªnd a body of a single animal. 18 This evidence is consistent with the emerging view among seismologists that systematic observation of animal behavior (in combination with other ancillary data) could lead to early warning of an impending natural disaster.
The disaster holds important lessons for coastal resource management (Clarke 2005) . Since the beginning of the 20th century, Sri Lanka has had a law that prohibited construction within 300 meters of the shore. For many years this rule has been ignored or openly ºouted by individuals as well as hotel developers and shrimp farmers. Moreover, there has been gross violation of regulations prohibiting the mining of coral reefs and the destruction of coastal mangrove forests. Both reefs and mangroves act as splendid bulwarks against the wrath of the sea. Mining was not the only threat to the reefs. Fishermen used dynamite to stun and catch ªsh, blowing up everything for meters around. This illegal activity has continued over the years, wrecking the reef. There is clear evidence that thousands of lives could have been saved if the right action had been taken at the right time to enforce these regulations. Damage from the tsunami was much greater in areas where the incidence of violation of environmental regulations was greater (Clarke 2005) . In the aftermath of the tsunami, environmentalists and divers from across South and Southeast Asia have reported similar examples of the correlation between intact coastal ecological systems and reduced fatalities and damage. For instance, mangroves in southern India's Pitchavaram and Muthupet regions acted like shields and bore the brunt of the tsunami, protecting around 1,700 people who lived inland between 100 and 1,000 m from the mangrove forest. 19 As already noted, the death toll on the island of Simeulue in Indonesia was relatively low partly because of the mangrove forests that surrounded the island. In contrast, however, the uprooting or snapping off at midtrunk of mangroves caused extensive property damage in Thailand. 
Economic impact
The overall damage to Sri Lanka's economy has been estimated at around US$1 billion (4.5 percent of Sri Lanka's GDP). 21 Total ªnancial needs for reconstruction are estimated to be US$1.5-1.6 billion (table 9).
The immediate effect of the disaster on the growth performance of Sri Lanka's economy is likely to be small, mainly because the destruction was largely conªned to the southern and eastern provinces. The central bank is predicting that GDP growth will drop from a previously predicted 6 percent to around 5. Tourism and ªshing, the two main economic sectors of the tsunami-affected areas, have suffered massively. These sectors accounted for only 2.2 percent and 1.7 percent of Sri Lanka's GDP in 2003. More than 80 percent of the island's ªshing ºeet was wiped out, and more than 14,000 ªshermen were killed by the tsunami. Approximately 30 percent of the room capacity of tourist hotels was damaged. About three-fourths of the rooms were back in operation by the end of , but a sharp drop in occupancy levels is expected because of inadequate infrastructure. With respect to other economic activities, the rice crop was not badly affected, even in the coastal areas of Ampara and Batticaloa. However, heavy loss of life along the coastal belt will lead to severe manpower shortages that could impede harvesting operations. There will be adverse implications for the insurance and banking indus-28 Asian Economic Papers Indian Ocean Tsunami try. This sector's proªtability for 2005 is likely to be materially impaired as a result of potential write-offs and provisions against bad loans that could arise as a result of the damage. Loans extended to the affected regions amount to only 5-10 percent of total loans, in the case of the large banks. However, losses to banks from borrowers who were directly affected by the tsunami will be signiªcant, given the signiªcant damage to the loans' underlying collateral (such as real estate and stock-in-trade), which would have normally mitigated the banks' losses. As with banks, the exposure of non-bank ªnancial institutions (e.g., leasing companies and ªnance companies) to the affected areas is low, but losses to ordinary citizens could be high, because vehicles in Sri Lanka were typically not covered for such perils as tsunamis or earthquakes.
According to IMF estimates, the current account deªcit of Sri Lanka will widen from US$2.28 billion in 2004 to US$2.69 billion in 2005. Although the country's main export sectors (textiles and garments) have not been affected, earnings from tourism (which account for about 7 percent of total current account receipts) are expected to fall in 2005 by about 15 percent compared with earnings in 2004. Imports related to reconstruction activities are expected be reºected in a 3 percent increase in the import bill. However, aid inºows (provided, of course, that the donor countries honor their pledges) will likely be more than sufªcient to counterbalance these adverse developments and to generate a modest overall surplus in the balance of payments.
The indications are that the adverse economic impacts of the disaster will result in a signiªcant increase in the incidence of poverty. The affected provinces (mainly in the Total (US$ million) 970-1,000 500 1,000-1,100 1,500-1,600
Percentage of GDP 4.4-4.6 7.0-7.3
Sources: Asian Development Bank, Japan Bank for International Cooperation, and World Bank (2005) .
south and southeast) contribute about 17.5 percent of GDP but account for 26 percent of the total population of Sri Lanka. The per capita GDP in these provinces is estimated at US$640, considerably less than the national average (US$930) and the average in the western provinces (US$1,500). Vulnerable groups in the affected regions, such as ªshermen who live close to the shore in simple houses and shelters and people who make a living from various informal-sector activities that have evolved around tourism, have borne the brunt of the negative impact, in conformity with the "life-and-death arithmetic" of disasters the world over (Sachs 2005) . The ADB predicts that the tsunami's immediate and lingering effects will throw some 250,000 people below the poverty line. This implies an increase in the overall per capita poverty rate in Sri Lanka from the present level of 22.7 percent (World Bank 2004) to 25 percent.
Disaster management
The ªrst phase of disaster management in Sri Lanka has gone smoothly. At the beginning, many feared that the outbreak of disease could cause signiªcant economic disruption. This scenario never materialized (World Health Organization 2005) . No outbreaks of epidemics or unusual clusters of communicable diseases have been reported other than a few sporadic cases of diarrhea and acute respiratory infections. There is little evidence about problems related to rescue operations in the areas controlled by the LTTE. Rescue missions returning from the area, however, have attested to the effectiveness of the organized response initiated by the LTTE immediately after the tsunami hit the coastline under their control. Similar to other grassroots political organizations, the LTTE has a well-developed operational network and trained personnel to respond to humanitarian emergencies.
At the time of the tsunami, the macroeconomic conditions of Sri Lanka's economy were precarious. The government was running a budget deªcit of over 8 percent of GDP. 22 Public debt amounted to over 100 percent of GDP. The newly elected government was relying predominantly on the central bank to implement its costly election promises (i.e., the bank was printing money). Sri Lanka's external debt amounted to US$11 billion ( Notwithstanding Sri Lanka's improved ªnancial position, the task of disaster management became more complex as it moved beyond the immediate, humanitarian rescue and relief stage into the reconstruction and rebuilding stage. It remains to be seen whether the government can overcome its usual very slow pace of project implementation; for the past decade, the annual rate of absorption of foreign aid in Sri Lanka has varied from 40 to 45 percent. So far progress has been slow. By mid-May, more than 75 percent of the displaced people were still living in rehabilitation camps and/or with friends and relatives. Unlike in Aceh, there has been rapid progress in clearing major roads and restoring public utilities, but as of May 2005 major reconstruction and rebuilding projects were still at the planning stage (ADB 2005) . The rescue and rehabilitation phase has gone smoothly because the objectives were straightforward and individuals' cooperative behavior did not leave much room for ideological differences. Unfortunately, domestic politics has come to the fore in the reconstruction process, leading to problems involving multiple objectives and conºicts of interest in resource allocation. Delay in government action has begun to act as a major deterrent to rehabilitation and reconstruction carried out by affected individuals themselves, NGOs, and other civil-society organizations.
The proposed regulations for reconstruction (to be implemented through the Urban Development Authority and the Coast Conservation Department) include a ban on the construction of dwellings within 100 m of the beach. Implementation of this coastal buffer zone legislation has already come under ªre. The displaced ªshermen who were previously living within this zone are demanding that they be given houses built on the immediately adjacent stretch of land. They worry about the safety of their boats and wish to have easy access to the sea. The hotel industry is concerned about the adverse implications of the buffer zone on its construction plans; over 10 beach hotel projects on the southwestern coast, worth US$30 million, are said to be on hold as a result of the restriction. The buffer zone proposal soon turned into a major stumbling block for the implementation of the resettlement program, as the major opposition party (the United National Party) sided with the protestors.
The role of government in the resettlement of affected families has become a controversial issue. The United National Party advocated rehabilitation initiatives that would put resources into the people's hands and let them decide how best to proceed. However, the government is planning to play a major role in the reconstruction of houses for displaced people for two main reasons. First, this would ensure effective implementation of the buffer zone legislation. Second, many displaced families (particularly those living in more densely populated affected areas) do not have clear titles to their land, a problem which has become enormously complicated by the large loss of life in these areas. For many of these families, it will be difªcult to rebuild on their own, even if funds are made readily available.
It is important to bear in mind that the tsunami disaster occurred in Sri Lanka against the backdrop of a long-standing ethno-political conºict and at a time when the negotiation process to end it through political means was under severe stress. Disaster management in Sri Lanka therefore involves interesting and possibly unsettling political dimensions. In the wake of the disaster, there were hopes among political circles that the tsunami devastation would present an opportunity for cooperation between the government and the LTTE, particularly because much of the devastation took place in the eastern provinces, the power base of the LTTE. The tsunami destroyed the bulk of the assets and personnel of the LTTE naval force (the Sea Tigers), and the overall death toll and economic destruction were much larger in the LTTE-dominated east relative to the rest of the country. However, these hopes were soon dashed because the government and the international aid community failed to draw up a conºict-sensitive disaster management strategy involving the LTTE as an equal partner. 23 The government soon was accused by the LTTE (and by the Muslim community in the east) of overly focusing its relief efforts in the south of the country, where the majority Sinhalese population live. The LTTE regards the eastern provinces as territory under its control and naturally would not like to see the government improve its popularity among the local population. The success of the reconstruction process crucially depends on the ability of the government to ensure that its fragile relations with the LTTE do not erupt into renewed conºict.
The ability of the government to get the LTTE involved as an equal partner in the rehabilitation and reconstruction process has been severely constrained by its weak power base. The People's Alliance government of Chandrika Kumaranatunga is a loose coalition of seven parties of varying political shades. The "Marxist-nationalist" People's Liberation Front, Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), which is the largest ally of Kumaranatunga's party (Sri Lanka Freedom Party) in the coalition, is a strong opponent of any form of devolution of power to the LTTE. The JVP has set up its own relief fund and appears to have strengthened its traditional support base in the south of the country through highly efªcient, grassroots-level rescue and rehabilitation work in the aftermath of the tsunami. Recently it threatened to topple the government in the event of any move by the president in favor of accommodating LTTE demands. To make matters worse, relations between the administration of Kumaranatunga and the opposition United National Party have been very poor in recent months. These relations weakened further after President Kumaranatunga's offhand statement in mid-February 2005 (which she subsequently withdrew) that, for the sake of smooth implementation of the reconstruction program, she would remain in power for 5 more years.
Because the reconstruction process involves massive investment in nontradable activities, the allocation of government funds needs to be managed carefully to avoid jeopardizing macroeconomic stability. Macroeconomic management during reconstruction becomes even more complicated when a country relies on massive aid inºows to ªnance these activities. Unless such inºows of capital are managed in an orderly fashion, the possibility of real exchange rate appreciation, with adverse implications for the traded-goods sectors (export-producing and import-competing sectors) cannot be ruled out.
The exchange rate of the Sri Lanka rupee, which has been under a highly ºexible managed ºoating regime since 2001, began to appreciate as pledges to provide aid began to mount, even before a substantial number of these pledges actually materialized. Its exchange rate (SLR/US$), which stood at 105 on 20 December 2004, had declined to about 95 by mid-January 2005 (ªgure 4). Initially the central bank resisted intervening in the foreign-exchange market, despite recurrent demands by exporters. However, from about the third week of January 2005, it began to "lean against the wind" to stabilize the exchange rate. Central bank intervention appears to have been useful in stabilizing the currency in nominal terms: from about late it has slightly recovered, and the exchange rate has remained in the narrow range of 99.3-99.7 SLR/US$. However, it is too early to assess the implications of capital inºows for the movement of the real exchange rate. There will be pressure for real exchange appreciation when expenditures on reconstruction begin to affect domestic nontradable prices. On the other hand, actual aid ºows may fall short of the pledges, dampening the initial optimism of foreign-exchange-market participants and reducing this pressure. There are two main reasons that actual aid ºows amount to less than the total pledges. First, evidence from previous humanitarian crises suggests that some pledges are "face-saving" commitments that lead to subsequent reshufºing of the aid portfolio while keeping the total aid to the given country largely unchanged. Second, even if we assume all pledges to be genuine, whether they will be translated into actual aid ºows depends crucially on the aid absorption capacity of the given country.
Concluding remarks
A simple but important lesson from the tsunami disaster on 26 December 2004 in Sri Lanka and Indonesia (and the other tsunami-affected countries in the region) is the need to educate the population about simple precautions that will save lives during tsunami (and other national disasters public that a receding sea is a warning of impending killer waves would have saved thousands of lives. The case for improving public awareness by requiring that such knowledge be an integral part of the school education system is particularly strong in Indonesia, because the frequency and severity of natural disasters there have been increasing.
The tsunami disaster holds important lessons in the area of coastal resource management. There is evidence that thousands of lives could have been saved if environmental regulations had been enforced to preserve coral reefs and mangrove forests, which act as effective buffers against tsunami. There is a clear need for systematic analysis of the link between violations of environmental regulations and the severity of the destruction caused by the killer waves in Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and other tsunami-affected countries in order to drive home this message.
An immediate reaction to the tsunami calamity has been a call for action to set up early warning systems. This proposition certainly deserves serious attention. To be effective, however, any early warning system needs to be implemented as part of a carefully designed disaster management program. As the Sri Lankan experience with the seismic monitoring center established with the assistance of the University of California and the USGS vividly demonstrated, the mere acquisition of hardware will not do the job. Scientists need to be trained to operate the system, and a ªrm political commitment is required for the smooth implementation of the project. More importantly, ample evidence from disasters in other countries shows that disaster prediction is of little beneªt in the absence of disaster preparedness as a social arrangement, achieved (among other means) through proper education and training and through an extensive media campaign.
Indonesia and Sri Lanka's experiences reconªrm evidence from disasters in other countries that the poor bear the brunt of such calamities. Thus, a national development strategy should emphasize policies and programs that will help cushion the poor from the effects of natural disasters. For disaster-prone countries such as Indonesia, there is a clear need for institutional mechanisms and procedures, backed by a central disaster management fund, with the capacity to engage swiftly in rescue and initial rehabilitation operations. To be effective, such institutional mechanisms and procedures should have operational links with national and international NGOs, other charitable organizations, and various UN organizations involved in disaster management.
Sri Lanka and Indonesia's disaster management records over the past 5 months clearly demonstrate that mere availability of funds does not guarantee speedy im-plementation of reconstruction programs. Effective absorption of aid crucially depends on the ability of the authorities of the affected country to engage local communities, local governments, NGOs, and international donor agencies in both the planning and implementation processes. This can be a daunting task, particularly if the disaster occurs in a country or area (such as Aceh and eastern Sri Lanka) that suffers from a deep-rooted ethno-political conºict. Engaging international donors in the development of reconstruction projects and aid programs, to minimize any mismatches between donors' interests and the country's reconstruction priorities, is vital for maximizing national gains from the generosity of donors. The international donor community should give serious consideration to designing innovative strategies for improving aid effectiveness in speciªc disaster situations.
Finally, Sri Lanka's post-tsunami experience offers an important lesson for macroeconomic management in the reconstruction phase when a disaster-affected country relies on massive aid inºows. Unless the inºow of capital is managed in an orderly fashion, there is the possibility of exchange rate appreciation, with adverse implications for the traded-goods (export-producing and import-competing) sectors.
